Feed-in tariffs with minimum price guarantees and regulatory uncertainty by Barbosa, Luciana et al.
Feed-in Tariffs with Minimum Price Guarantees
and Regulatory Uncertainty
Luciana Barbosaa, Paulo Ferrãoa, Artur Rodriguesb, and Alberto Sardinhac
aMIT Portugal Program and Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa
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Abstract
The feed-in tariff (FIT) program is a popular policy for incentivizing new renewable
energy projects because it establishes a long-term contract with renewable energy investors.
This paper presents a novel model to analyze a FIT contract with a minimum price guarantee
(i.e., a price-floor regime) from an investor’s perspective. The results show that a perpetual
guarantee only induces investment for prices below the price floor when offering a risk-free
investment opportunity. In contrast, the finite guarantee may induce investment even when
the revenue from the guarantee is lower than the investment cost. When an investor faces
a scenario with regulatory uncertainty, a higher and more likely reduction in the price floor
induces earlier investment. For all cases, investors postpone an investment decision when
market conditions present a higher price volatility.
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1 Introduction
The generation of energy from renewable resources, such as wind and sunlight, is an important
option that can mitigate many environmental problems. In addition, the utilization of depletable
resources, such as gas or coal, for generating energy is a problem from a sustainability perspective
because these resources may not be available for future generations. Therefore, policymakers can
incentivize energy generation through renewable resources, and consequently decrease the social
cost of scarcity and prices of resources while social welfare increases.
There are many policies to incentivize renewable energy projects (Grubb 2004), which in turn
might reduce environmental pollution, global warming and public health issues. For instance,
the Renewable Portfolio Standards (Wiser, Namovicz, Gielecki & Smith 2007) in the US and
the RES Directive (Klessmann, Lamers, Ragwitz & Resch 2010) in the EU are policies that are
playing an increasingly important role in the decision-making process of generation companies.
Couture & Gagnon (2010) state that the feed-in tariff (FIT) program is considered one of the most
important policies for stimulating new renewable energy projects. FIT programs are long-term
contracts with renewable energy producers (e.g., homeowners, firms and organizations such as
schools and community groups) to enhance energy generation.
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In addition, Couture & Gagnon (2010) present many different remuneration schemes used by
policymakers that have evolved over time. FIT policies can be classified into two groups. The first
group, also known as market-independent FIT, uses a fixed-price policy, where the remuneration
is independent from the electricity market price. The second group is a premium-price policy, also
known as market-dependent FIT, because a premium payment is added to the electricity market
price. The market-independent FITs have been widely employed in many countries, because these
policies create a lower risk investment condition. In contrast, market-dependent FITs present a
greater risk for investors but also create an incentive to produce more electricity when it is needed
most and provide slightly higher income to investors (Schallenberg-Rodriguez & Haas 2012).
Market-dependent FITs have been implemented in Spain, Germany and Denmark, among other
countries.
Since the inception of the first FIT program in 1978, policymakers have constantly reviewed
FIT schemes in order to achieve specific energy policy goals. Ritzenhofen & Spinler (2016) present
many reasons for these reviews. For example, policymakers are constantly trying to find more
efficient schemes aimed at promoting renewable energy investments. Another important reason
for reviewing the scheme is to find a cost-effective policy that is accepted by society and is subject
to budget constraints. Hence, investors must take into account the risk of policy reductions within
the decision-making process of a renewable energy project.
This article presents a real options model to analyze a FIT with a minimum price guarantee
(i.e., a price-floor regime) in two scenarios, namely a perpetual guarantee and a finite guarantee.
Within this policy, a producer either receives a fixed amount if the market price is below the
price floor or the market price when the price is above the price floor. This FIT design is
considered a variable-premium FIT according to Couture & Gagnon (2010) and is also known as
minimum payment guarantee, minimum price policies or spot market gap model (Couture, Kreycik
& Williams 2010) . In particular, variations of the minimum price guarantee have been used in the
Netherlands (Couture et al. 2010), Ireland (Doherty & O’Malley 2011) and Switzerland (Couture
et al. 2010). We then continue the analysis in a scenario that includes a regulatory uncertainty,
whereby the price floor may decrease.
Our model includes managerial flexibilities and computes the optimal investment threshold
based on an analytical real options framework. We use the model to analyze how the price floor,
its duration and policy uncertainty before the project starts affect the investment threshold and
the value of the project. Not only may this analysis provide insights to investors (e.g., regarding
optimal investment timing and value of the project), but also to policymakers (e.g., regarding
FIT design).
The results show that a perpetual guarantee is not economically sound. This is due to the
fact that a perpetual guarantee can only induce investment for prices below the price floor when
the revenue from the guarantee is higher than the investment cost. Apparently, this is a counter-
intuitive result due to the perpetual guarantee, which is not foregone if investment does not occur.
On the other hand, for the finite scenario, the guarantee can induce investment for prices below
the price floor when the revenue is below the investment cost. In addition, the finite guarantee
induces an earlier investment decision as we increase the price floor and duration.
Considering the risk of reduction on the price floor due to regulatory uncertainty, the perpetual
guarantee continues to induce investment only for prices below the price floor when a risk-free
investment opportunity is offered. The results also show that either greater changes in the price
floor or higher probabilities of a reduction occurring on the price floor lead to lower investment
thresholds. This is due to the fact that investors accelerate investment in order to guarantee a
higher price floor.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work and our main con-
tributions to literature. Section 3 presents the model and analysis of a FIT with a minimum
price guarantee, where we present the perpetual and finite guarantee cases. Section 4 presents
an extension of our model where we include regulatory uncertainty. Finally, Section 5 presents
2
discussion and concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
There is a large set of topics related to the work presented in this paper. We broadly group
these into two main categories: work related to FITs and support schemes for renewable energy
projects, and work related to real options approaches applied to energy investment.
2.1 FIT and Support Schemes for Renewable Energy Projects
Many research works have been carried out to discuss a multitude of policy mechanisms to ac-
celerate the investment in renewable energy projects. For example, Abolhosseini & Heshmati
(2014) compare three widely used support schemes for renewable energy projects, namely FITs,
tax incentives and renewable portfolio standard. As previously stated, FITs are long-term con-
tracts that are price-based incentives. Tax incentives are fiscal incentives (e.g., subsidies and
tax deductions) to enhance renewable energy deployment. Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
is a quantity-based incentive whereby utility companies have to increase the production from
designated renewable energy sources (i.e., an obligation to produce a specified fraction from des-
ignated renewable sources). For every unit of renewable energy produced, the utilities receive a
tradable green certificate. Utilities that generate more renewable electricity than required by the
RPS obligation may sell (or trade) the certificates to other utilities that have not achieved their
own RPS obligation. The regulatory body then receives these certificates in order to determine
whether utilities are compliant with their RPS obligations. The work draws three main conclu-
sions. First, investors prefer fixed-price FITs when they are seeking schemes with a lower risk.
Second, tax incentives can also attract investors because they make cash available (i.e., increases
investor liquidity). Third, the implementation of RPS relies on a private market for utilities to
trade certificates. Thus, this market-based policy may lead to price competition and consequently
more efficient energy markets. Butler & Neuhoff (2008) compare different support schemes for
renewable energy projects in the UK and Germany. The authors state that FITs in Germany
are more effective in promoting the deployment of renewable energy projects than other support
schemes in the UK (i.e., Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation and Renewables Obligation Certificates).
In 1978, FIT was first implemented as part of the US Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act.
Many authors (e.g., Couture & Gagnon (2010) and Lesser & Su (2008)) claim that FITs are the
most successful support scheme for incentivizing renewable energy projects. Lesser & Su (2008)
state that FITs require policymakers to define many attributes such as payment amounts for
different technologies (e.g. wind power or solar photovoltaics), payment structures (e.g., fixed
payment or premium over market prices), and payment duration. Since FITs are long-term
contracts (typically 20 years), policymakers have to use forecasts of future market conditions
and rates of technological improvements in order to define these attributes. However, long-term
forecasts are typically inaccurate and imprecise due to the high uncertainty that affects the market
and technology. From an investor’s perspective, the definition of these attributes can have a big
impact on the decision-making process of investing in a renewable energy project.
Regarding research work on FITs, Couture & Gagnon (2010) present many different remu-
neration schemes utilized by policymakers that have evolved over time. All these remuneration
schemes can be classified into two groups: (i) Market-independent FIT - a fixed-price policy, where
the remuneration is independent from the electricity market price, and (ii) Market-dependent FIT
- a premium-price policy, where the remuneration is set by premium payments tied to the electric-
ity market price. The work states that market-independent FITs increase investment security and
hence attract more investors. In contrast, market-dependent FITs are market-based mechanisms
that create incentives to produce energy when demand is high. However, both market-independent
and market-dependent FITs (in particular, the fixed-premium schemes) may lead to either over
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or under compensation. The work suggests that variable-premium FITs, with caps and floors
within the FIT structure, integrate the strengths of both market dependent and independent
policies. Schallenberg-Rodriguez & Haas (2012) present a review of the implementation of the
fixed-price and variable-premium FITs in Spain. The authors claim that fixed-price policies are
more adequate to small investors and less-mature technologies while variable-premium polices are
indicated for large investors and mature technologies.
Market-independent FITs have the key advantage of creating conditions for a secure invest-
ment, where price risk is removed and costs of financing are more likely to be reduced (Couture
et al. 2010). FITs with a minimum price guarantee also share the same condition when the mar-
ket price is below the price floor. However, this condition for a secure investment may disappear
if policymakers set the price floor with very low values, whereby investors will hardly receive
the payments from the guarantee. Market-dependent FITs have the key advantage of creating
incentives to produce energy when demand is high (Couture & Gagnon 2010). This feature is
also present in FITs with a minimum price guarantee when the market price is above the price
floor. However, setting price floors with high values removes this incentive. From a policy-making
perspective, the key challenges of FITs with a price floor is actually deciding the value of the
price floor and duration of the guarantee, while trying to maintain the key features of market-
independent and market-dependent FITs. Our work sheds some light to policymakers regarding
the decision of defining the price floor and duration of the guarantee and how this can impact the
investment decision.
In Ireland, the REFIT 1, 2, and 3 (DCCAE 2016) are variable-premium FITs that are com-
prised of the following elements: (i) Price floor - The contract applies an indexed price floor, called
the reference price, on the annual market price revenue. In other words, if an annual market rev-
enue is below a revenue yielded by the price floor, the Public Service Obligation (PSO) mechanism
will refund the difference. In particular, each technology category (e.g., wind or biomass) has a
different indexed price floor in order to support technologies with different cost levels. (ii) Balanc-
ing Payment - Under REFIT 1, the PSO gives an additional payment (15% of the indexed price
floor), irrespective of the market price or technology. Under REFIT 2 and 3, the PSO gives an
additional payment of up to a maximum of e 9.90 per MWh, whereby the payment only applies
when the market price is lower than the combination of the indexed price floor plus the balancing
payment. A few papers have analyzed the Irish REFIT scheme. For example, scholars have ana-
lyzed the impact of the REFIT policy on biomass crops (Clancy, Breen, Thorne & Wallace 2012)
and wave power (Deane, Dalton & Gallachóir 2012).
While many research works have focused on discussing different policies and design options
for FITs, only few analytical approaches are presented to analyze FIT policies and the impact on
renewable energy projects from an investor’s perspective. With an analytical approach, managers
can obtain important information regarding the renewable energy project, such as the investment
threshold and the value of the project.
2.2 Real Option Approaches for Energy Investments
The term real options was coined by Myers (1977) and provides a methodology to better value
investment projects in the presence of managerial flexibilities. The real options framework was
introduced by Tourinho (1979), which analyzes the option to extract oil when future prices are
uncertain. Brennan & Schwartz (1985) also present one of the first contributions to the real
options literature tailored for mineral extraction investments. McDonald & Siegel (1986) derived
the optimal investment rule which takes into account the value of waiting. They showed that the
standard net present value (NPV) analysis is grossly wrong.
Investment decisions in the corporate world are normally based on the NPV rule, whereby a
project with a positive NPV is accepted. However, the standard NPV valuation underestimates
the value of the project as the method does not take into account uncertainties and managerial
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flexibilities that are present in dynamic environments. For instance, a project with a negative NPV
may lead to a successful investment, because the NPV does not include the value of important
decisions that managers use in practice, such as gathering information from the market and
waiting to invest until market conditions are favorable. Hence, the real options approach provides
a good framework for valuations of renewable energy projects, since managerial flexibilities and
uncertainties are incorporated into the model.
Power generation projects have several uncertainties, such as market price uncertainty and
regulatory uncertainty. In addition, the investment in power generation is irreversible and has
several managerial flexibilities. In fact, Ceseña, Mutale & Rivas-Dávalos (2013) state that real
option approaches can be very useful for analyzing energy generation projects, especially renew-
able energy projects. Their work concludes that many research opportunities are still available
regarding the application of real options theory to the renewable energy field.
Regarding real options research in the energy field, Boomsma, Meade & Fleten (2012) value
investments from renewable energy sources in order to examine investment behavior under dif-
ferent investment schemes, namely FITs (fixed price and fixed premium) and renewable energy
certificate trading. With a case study on wind power generation, the work shows that fixed-price
FITs create incentives for speeding up investment while the certificate trading is more appro-
priate for larger projects. Abadie, Chamorro & González-Eguino (2013) determine the optimal
time to invest in energy efficiency (EE) enhancements within a firm and the impact that some
policy measures may have on the time to invest. The results show that policies for EE may bring
the time to invest some years forward. Adkins & Paxson (2016) examine different government
subsidy arrangements (e.g., permanent and retractable) and the impact on the optimal time to
invest. The authors conclude that subsidies can encourage early investment, especially permanent
subsidies.
Ritzenhofen & Spinler (2016) investigate the effect of regulatory uncertainty on the investment
behavior. In particular, the work analyzes three scenarios. First, a fixed-price FIT where payments
do not change over time. Second, a free-market regime where electricity is sold on the spot market.
Third, a regime switching scenario where jurisdictions may switch from a fixed-price FIT to a
free-market regime (or the reverse case), thus creating regulatory uncertainty. The results show
that regulatory uncertainty delays or even reduces investment when fixed-FIT price is close to
market price. In a scenario where the market price is significantly higher than the fixed-FIT
price, investment is then accelerated. While this work also takes into consideration the effect of
a regulatory uncertainty, it does not analyze a price-floor regime where a regulator may reduce
the price floor at any time before the signature of the contract. In addition, the work models
the regulatory uncertainty with a numerical approach (i.e., lattice-based method), while our work
uses an analytical real options framework.
Boomsma & Linnerud (2015) use an analytical real options framework to analyze the effect of
market and policy uncertainties on a renewable investment decision with three different subsidies.
Depending on the policy scheme, the model may use a stochastic price and stochastic subsidy.
In particular, the fixed-price FIT has no uncertainty, the fixed-premium FIT has a stochastic
price and the green certificate scheme has both stochastic price and stochastic subsidy. The work
claims that the difference between the risk of a market-based support scheme (i.e., tradable green
certificates) and a fixed-price FIT is less than commonly expected, given that the electricity and
subsidy prices are not perfectly correlated. The authors also argue that policy uncertainty (i.e.,
scheme termination) increases the investment threshold and consequently slows down investment
when the termination decision is retroactively applied to new and old installations. When the
decision is not retroactively applied, the termination decision speeds up investment. In comparison
to our work, the model does not analyze a subsidy with a minimum price guarantee and the
regulatory uncertainty only considers a scheme termination, while our work analyzes a scenario
where the subsidy may be reduced.
Doherty & O’Malley (2011) analyze the Irish REFIT program with a real options approach. In
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particular, the work uses a Generalized Extreme Value distribution to forecast the mean expected
market value of wind and the value of the put option (given a strike price). With these forecasts,
the authors calculate the mean expected market value of wind with a price floor and balancing
payment. Consequently, the work analyzes the efficiency of the Irish scheme. From a policy-
making perspective, Kim & Lee (2012) analyze four different FIT schemes (i.e., fixed price, fixed-
premium, minimum price guarantee, sliding premium) with a real options numerical technique
(i.e., binomial lattice and simulation). Although the two previous works also analyze a FIT with
a minimum price guarantee, the findings are focused on the efficiency of the schemes from a
policy-making viewpoint and are not based on an analytical real options framework. With an
analytical approach, the analysis could take into consideration important information regarding
the investment decision, such as the optimal investment threshold.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper presents the first research work regarding an analytical
model of a FIT with a minimum price guarantee, which can be used to derive the option value and
the optimal investment threshold. In addition, we also compare a finite and perpetual support
scheme in order to draw conclusions for both investors and policymakers. We then continue the
analysis in order to include a regulatory uncertainty.
In fact, our model relates and contributes to the literature in several ways. Our first contribu-
tion is to the real option community, where we build on the work from Shackleton & Wojakowski
(2007) in order to derive an analytical model of a FIT with a finite guarantee. Within this research
community, the closest work to ours is the paper from Adkins & Paxson (2017), which uses an
analytical framework to analyze a Public-Private Partnership arrangement with a perpetual floor
and ceiling. Our work departs from the perpetual analysis in order to analyze a more realistic
scenario with a finite duration of a price floor and regulatory uncertainty.
Our second contribution is to the energy research community, where we present a powerful
model of a variable-premium FIT with a price-floor regime. The model takes into account man-
agerial flexibilities and uncertainties within two different scenarios, namely a perpetual and finite
guarantee. We show how this support scheme may affect the investment decision in renewable
energy projects. We extend the analysis in order to include a regulatory uncertainty. In particu-
lar, we show how the probability of changing the support scheme affects the value of the option
and investment threshold.
3 Modeling a FIT with a Minimum Price Guarantee
We analyze the renewable energy project from a single investor’s perspective. The investor aims
to optimize the project value of the investment, taking into consideration the uncertainties and
managerial flexibilities.
In practice, investors use the NPV to value investment projects and usually assume that the
project is always deployed after a fixed period of time. In contrast to the standard NPV valuation,
the real options approach assumes that while time passes, the investor can gather information and
revise assumptions about the future investment or contraction. In other words, more information
is revealed while time passes, hence investors can make better decisions about future actions. The
investor has therefore a waiting option to deploy the renewable energy project. This option to
defer can add value to the project due to uncertainties (McDonald & Siegel 1986).
The most important options in our model are the following: (i) waiting option, where the
investor has an option to wait to deploy the project when the market is favorable; and (ii) put
options, where the investor has a set of options of selling energy for the price floor F instead of
selling energy for the market price P ; in other words, for any value of P at any time T , the option
is exercised when F is greater than P .
In addition, we assume that the investment decision is applicable to all kinds of renewable
energy projects, such as wind power or solar photovoltaic. The following subsections present two
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different scenarios of FIT contracts with a minimum price guarantee, namely a perpetual and
finite guarantee.
3.1 Perpetual Guarantee
We start assuming that the FIT contract has a perpetual guarantee. Consequently, an investor
may receive payments from the guarantee for the entire lifetime of the project and not for all future
projects. Although a FIT contract with a perpetual guarantee is not used by any jurisdiction, this
scenario is interesting to analyze and compare with the finite guarantee, which is a more realistic
assumption. The FIT contract is based on a price-floor regime. In other words, the investor (or
producer) receives the price floor F for every unit of energy produced, when the market price P
is below the price floor. When the market price is above the price floor, the producer receives the
market price.
We assume that the energy market price P follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) in
Equation 1, which is the usual assumption in real options models. According to Pindyck (2001),
while the GBM might not be the most accurate process for representing spot market prices of
commodities, it is analytically convenient in real option models. In fact, Lo & Wang (1995) show
that the GBM in real option applications typically generate small errors due to the long duration
of the projects. Other research works on renewable energy investment (e.g., Ritzenhofen & Spinler
(2016) and Boomsma et al. (2012)) have used this assumption.
dP = µPdt+ σPdW (1)
where µ < r is a deterministic drift under the risk neutral measure of the future market
electricity price, r is the risk-free interest rate, σ > 0 is the volatility, and dW is the standard
Brownian motion process.
Let V (P, F ) be the value of the project. Applying Itô’s Lemma (Dixit & Pindyck 1994) lead
us to the Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE):
µ P
∂V (P, F )
∂P
+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2V (P, F )
∂P 2
− rV (P, F ) + Π(P, F ) = 0 (2)
where Π(P, F ) is a perpetual profit flow of the renewable energy project with a FIT. Hence,
the profit flow yields F , when the market price is below the price floor F of the FIT. Otherwise,
the profit flow yields P , when the market price is above the price floor of the FIT.
Π(P, F ) = Max(P, F ) (3)
In Equation 3, we assume that P is a revenue for one unit of energy and F is a revenue
from the guarantee for one unit of energy. However, one can easily convert these parameters for
an annual production by multiplying these unit values by the quantity of energy produced in a
year. An example of a conversion is presented in Section 3.3 where we use annualized values. In
addition, we assume that the production cost has zero marginal cost, based on the data from the
US Energy Information Administration (EIA 2017).
And the general solution to the ODE in Equation 2 is given by:













for P > F
(4)
where A1, A2, B1 and B2 are constants that are yet to be determined through economic













































We now present the three boundary conditions to determine the constants A1, A2, B1 and
B2. First, note that for the region where the market price is below the price floor, the value of
the project should converge to
F
r
when P goes to zero. However, this only happens if A2 is zero
because β2 < 0.




when P goes to infinity. However, if B1 is different from zero and P
goes to infinity, the function V (P, F ) would blow out because β1 > 1. Hence, B1 should be zero
and the value of the project is:











for P > F
(8)
In the first branch (i.e., P < F ), note that the term
F
r
is equal to the value of the project if
the investor receives a constant cash flow F . The term A1P
β1 is an added value that captures the
option of receiving an extra cash flow when the market price is above the guarantee. Similarly in
the second branch (i.e., P > F ), the term
P
r − µ
is equal to the value of the project if the investor
only sells energy in the market for a price P . The term B2P
β2 captures the option of receiving
the price floor when the market price falls below the guarantee.
The third boundary condition is when the two regions above meet (i.e., P = F ). In addition,





















Assuming that an investor has a perpetual option to invest for a sunk cost of I, we can now
find the value of the option to invest F (P, F ) together with the optimal investment rule. We
know that the price P follows a geometric Brownian motion, hence we can follow the same steps
to calculate the value of the project in order to find the value of the option. In other words, the
solution of the ODE (Equation 2 without the perpetual profit flow) leads to a value of the option
that is given by:




We now apply a boundary condition in order to calculate C2. We know that F (0) = 0 when
P = 0, because P = 0 is an absorbing barrier. However, F (0) is only zero when C2 = 0, because
β2 < 0. Hence, the value of the option to invest is given by:
F (P, F ) = C1P
β1 (12)
It is straightforward to show that the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are not
met for the first branch of Equation 8 (i.e., P < F ). Hence, investment never occurs in this region,
except when F
r
> I, for which the investment occurs immediately and generates a risk-free payoff
(i.e., a positive net present value (NPV) for every P ). This apparently counter-intuitive result is
due to the perpetual guarantee, which is not foregone if investment does not occur.
The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for P > F are presented in Equations 13
and 14. The value-matching condition (Equation 13) is the optimal investment point where the
value of the option (Equation 12) is equal to the value of the project (Equation 8, when P > F )
minus the investment cost. In other words, the investor is indifferent between holding the option
or deploying the project. The smooth-pasting condition (Equation 14) is a requirement whereby
the value of the option and the value of the project meet tangentially (i.e., both have the same
slope) at the optimal investment point. Hence, we calculate the first derivatives of both sides of
Equation 13 with respect to the threshold for investment P ∗, which yields Equation 14.
C1P











From Equation 13, we isolate C1 such that C1 =
V (P ∗, F )− I
P ∗
β1
.Then, we substitute C1 in
Equation 12 which yields the first branch (i.e., P < P ∗) of Equation 15. The second branch (i.e.,
P > P ∗) of Equation 15 is an immediate investment, where the value of the option is equal to
the NPV (i.e., V (P, F )− I). Hence, Equation 15 presents the value of the option to invest:
F (P, F ) =






for P < P ∗
V (P, F )− I for P > P ∗
(15)
In addition, Equations 13 and 14 reduce to the following non-linear equation:
(β1 − β2)B2P ∗
β2 + (β1 − 1)
P ∗
r − µ
− β1I = 0 (16)
We can thus calculate the trigger for investment P ∗, when P ∗ > F , by numerically solving
Equation 16.
In addition, we calculate an interesting point where the trigger P ∗ is equal to the price floor












β2 + (β1 − 1)
F ∗
r − µ
− β1I = 0 (17)
Simplifying Equation 17 yields the following result:
F = rI (18)
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Equation 18 shows that F
r
− I = 0 when the trigger P ∗ is equal to the price floor F . This
means that values of F 6 P ∗ yield F
r
− I 6 0 and values of F > P ∗ yield F
r
− I > 0. Hence, the
values of the trigger in Equation 16 are only valid when F
r
− I 6 0 because P ∗ > F . In addition,
we also conclude that investment only occurs for P < F with a risk-free profit (i.e., a positive
NPV or F
r
− I > 0).
The next section studies the case of a finite-lived guarantee.
3.2 Finite Guarantee
In this section, we build on the work from Shackleton & Wojakowski (2007) to derive the value of
a renewable energy project that has a FIT contract with a finite duration. Just like the perpetual
scenario, an investor has the option to wait until the market conditions are favorable in order to
deploy the project. However, the FIT contract has now a finite duration of T years. In other
words, during T years, the investor (or producer) may earn F (i.e., price floor) for every unit of
energy produced, if the market price P is below the price floor. As mentioned in the previous
section, this is a more realistic assumption. The complete derivation is presented in Appendix A.
Equation 19 presents the value of the project until T , whereby the producer benefits from the
finite guarantee of the FIT contract.




















(1− e−(r−µ)TN(d1)) for P > F
(19)


















where β1, β2, 0 and 1 can substitute β.




e−(r−µ)T , which corresponds to selling energy to the market for the remaining lifetime of
the project . Hence, Equation 21 presents the value of the project, which includes the period with
the FIT contract and thereafter.




Note that the value of the project reduces to the present value P
r−µ when there is no guarantee
(i.e., F = 0). In the case of a perpetual guarantee (i.e., T =∞), the value of the project reduces
to Equation 8.1
1Proof is presented in Appendix B.
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We now calculate the value of the option to invest and the optimal investment rule. Equation
22 presents the value of the option to invest when P < P ∗. The value of the option derives from a
solution of the ODE and a boundary condition, following the same steps of the previous section.
FF (P, F ) = D1P
β1 (22)
Next, we derive the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. Recall that the value-
matching condition is the optimal investment point where the decision of holding the option
or deploying the project is indifferent from the investor’s perspective. And the smooth-pasting
condition requires that the value of the option needs to be tangent to the value of the project
at the optimal investment point. Therefore, we obtain the value-matching condition (Equation




F = VF (P
∗






F , F )
∂P ∗F
(24)
In addition, Equation 25 presents the value of the option to invest.









for P < P ∗F
VF (P, F )− I for P > P ∗F
(25)
Equations 23 and 24 reduce to the following nonlinear equations, that must be solved numer-
ically to find the investment threshold P ∗F (Appendix C):








(1− e−rT (1−N(d0)))− I
)
= 0 for P ∗F < F














e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
= 0 for P ∗F > F
(26)
In order to find the value of F where both branches of Equation 26 have the same solution,
we substitute F for P ∗F in the second branch :




































Rearranging Equation 27 yields the following equation:















− β1I = 0 (29)




− β1 − 1
r − µ
)
(1−N(dβ2(P ∗F=F ))) +
(β1 − 1)
r − µ







F − β1I = 0 (30)
We can thus calculate the value of F with Equation 30. In fact, this is an interesting point
of F from a policymaking perspective. If a policymaker sets the value of F above this point,
an investor starts a project receiving a revenue from the guarantee instead of a revenue from
the market price, because P ∗F < F . In addition, it is straightforward to show that Equation 30
converges to Equation 18 (i.e., the perpetual trigger when P ∗ = F ) when T → +∞.
Another interesting point of F from a policymaking perspective is when the NPV of the
investment is zero, because any value of F greater than this point generates a positive NPV
regardless of the value of the market price P . Consequently, offering an F above this point makes
the investment occur immediately and does not give the investor an option to wait.
In order to find this point, we calculate the NPV when P = 0. In other words, the NPV is the






Hence, for values of F greater than
Ir
(1− e−rT )
, investment occurs immediately and generates
a risk free profit. In fact, policymakers should set the value of the price floor F between the value
of F from Equation 30 and Equation 31, because this interval gives an investor a waiting option
and the project starts with a revenue from the guarantee.
In addition, calculating the limit of Equation 31 when T goes to +∞ is equal to Equation
18 (i.e., F = rI), which is the point where trigger P ∗ with a perpetual guarantee is equal to the
price floor F and has a NPV equal to zero. Hence, the distance between the value of F from
Equation 30 and Equation 31 goes to zero as T goes to +∞. From a policymaking viewpoint, the
interval that gives an investor a waiting option and provides a revenue from the guarantee when
the project starts is inexistent in the perpetual guarantee.
3.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we present a comparative statics analysis of the main drivers of the option to
invest in a renewable energy project. In particular, we analyze the behavior of the investment
threshold P ∗ as we change the price floor F , the duration of the guarantee T , and the volatility
of the price σ.
Despite the fact that our model is not tailored for any specific technology, we had to choose an
example in order to numerically calculate the investment threshold. Hence, we decided to use a
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typical European onshore wind farm with 25 wind turbines (Enevoldsen & Valentine 2016). Each
wind turbine has a capacity of 2 MW and a total investment cost of 1.5 Million Euros / MW,
which is a reasonable estimate according to EWEA (2009). We also consider a capacity factor
for each power plant to be 30% (i.e., average power generated is 30%) that lies within the 20% to
35% range estimates from EWEA (2009).
For simplicity’s sake, we analyze the investment threshold for a turbine, but the results can
be easily calculated for N turbines within a wind park. We also assume that our model uses
annualized parameters. For example, in a scenario where the market price is below the price
floor, a turbine yields an annual revenue of e 131,400.00 (i.e., 30 % x 2 MWh x e 25 / MWh x 24
hours x 365 days). Following the work by Ritzenhofen & Spinler (2016), we use the same GBM
parameters that have been calculated from real data: a deterministic drift of 0% and volatility of
19%. Table 1 summarizes the base-case parameters of the numerical analysis.
Table 1: Base-case parameters used to calculate the threshold
r risk-free rate 5%
F price floor e 25 / MWh
T finite duration of FIT 15 years
µ deterministic drift 0%
σ volatility 6%

















Figure 1: Investment thresholds (i.e., P ∗ and P ∗F ) as a function of the minimum price guarantee
(F )
Figure 1 presents the investment thresholds for a perpetual guarantee P ∗ (thin line) and for
a finite guarantee P ∗F ( thick line) as a function of the price floor F . The dashed line is the value
of the price floor F , which divides the graph into two important regions.
First, the region above the dashed line represents a market condition where prices are above
the price floor (i.e., P > F ). Within this region, the triggers of the perpetual and finite guarantees
decrease as the price floor increases. In other words, the triggers induce an earlier investment
13
decision as we increase the price floor. From a policymaking perspective, values of the triggers
that are greater than the price floor F create a scenario where a project starts receiving a revenue
from the market price instead of the revenue from the guarantee. The project is also more likely
to receive a revenue from the market price than the revenue from the guarantee throughout its
lifetime. Hence, values of price floors in this region make the policy scheme practically useless.
In Figure 1, the values of F in this region are between e 0 / MWh and e 28.54 / MWh for the
perpetual guarantee. Note that the value of F equal to e 28.54 is calculated from Equation 18
where P ∗ = F . In addition, the values of F for the finite case lie between e 0 / MWh and e 38.35
/ MWh. Note that the value of F equal to e 38.35 is calculated from Equation 30, where both
branches of the threshold meet. Another important observation is that Equation 30 converges to
Equation 18 as T → +∞, whereby the finite trigger converges to the perpetual trigger.
Second, the region below the dashed line depicts a market condition where the market price
is below the price floor (i.e., P < F ). In the finite case, the threshold values only exist for price
floors between e 38.35 / MWh, from Equation 30, and e 54.09 / MWh, from Equation 31. Recall
from Section 3.2 that values of F above e 54.09 / MWh generate a positive NPV and a condition
for an immediate investment. Policymakers that set the value of F within this interval give an
investor a waiting option and a revenue from the guarantee when the project starts.
Table 2 presents the intervals of F , when P < F , for different values of the duration of the
finite guarantee. We calculate Fmin with Equation 30 and Fmax with Equation 31. We observe
that the size of the intervals decreases as the duration increases. In fact, an interesting observation
is that Equation 30 converges to Equation 31 as T → +∞. In addition, Equation 31 converges
to Equation 18 as T → +∞, which also helps to understand why the perpetual guarantee does
not have investment threshold values for P < F .
For the region below the dashed line, when P < F , note that the threshold of the perpetual
guarantee is inexistent for price floors greater than e 28.54 / MWh (from Equation 30), because
this policy scheme only induces investment for price floors greater than e 28.54 with a risk-free
profit (i.e., a positive NPV), as shown in Section 3.1. Consequently, investors do not have a waiting
option for price floors greater than e 28.54, which is not economically sound from a policymaking
perspective.
Table 2: Intervals of the price floor for different values of the duration (T ) of the finite guarantee,
when the market price is below the price floor
10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years
Fmin (e / MWh) 41.54 28.54 36.01 34.27 32.97
Fmax (e / MWh) 72.53 38.35 45.15 40.00 36.74
In Figure 2, we see that a higher duration of the guarantee induces an earlier investment. As
expected, the threshold of the finite duration converges to the perpetual case as T increases. In
Appendix G, we prove analytically that the derivative of the optimal threshold with respect to T
is negative. In Figure 3, a higher volatility defers investment for both cases2.
4 FIT Under Regulatory Uncertainty
Regulatory uncertainty has become an issue for renewable energy projects because governments
have been changing their support schemes in the past years. Ritzenhofen & Spinler (2016) state
2Pindyck (1988) states in page 977 that the value of the option and the optimal investment threshold increase
as σ increases, but the work does not present an analytical proof for this statement. In page 192 of the book
from Dixit & Pindyck (1994), the authors also state that ∂P
∗
∂σ > 0, but do not present any analytical proof. We
numerically tested ∂P
∗






































Figure 3: Investment thresholds as a function of the volatility (σ)
that governments revisit their policies in order to adjust the schemes to various factors, such as
technology cost and budget constraints. However, policy revisions may have an impact on the
investment decision. For instance, in the UK, investment projects have been put on hold due to
government cuts to renewable energy subsidies (Megaw 2015).
In the following sections, we extend Section 3 and add a regulatory uncertainty into the FIT
models with a minimum price guarantee, namely the perpetual and finite guarantee. In particular,
we use a Poisson process in order to model occasional changes to the price floor before the project
starts. In other words, the price floor may change while an investor is waiting for favorable market
conditions. After the market price is equal to the optimal investment threshold, the investor signs
a contract with a fixed price floor.
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4.1 Perpetual Guarantee
In this section, we model a FIT with a perpetual guarantee that can be affected by a policy change
(also known as a jump event) on the price floor before the project starts. In particular, we follow




+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2FR(P, F )
∂P 2
− rFR(P, F ) + λ[F (P, ωF )− FR(P, F )] = 0 (32)
where λ denotes the mean arrival rate of a jump event during a time interval dt. Note that
F and P are uncorrelated. In addition, the probability of occurring a jump event is λdt. The
parameter ω is defined within the interval [0, 1], whereby the price floor changes to ωF if the
jump event occurs. The value of the option with regulatory uncertainty is FR(P, F ). In addition,
F (P, ωF ) is the value of the option when the price floor is ωF , which is equal to Equation 33.
Note that Equation 33 is equal to Equation 15 where we substitute ωF for F .
F (P, ωF ) =

C1(ωF )P
β1 for P < P ∗(ωF )
V (P, ωF )− I for P > P ∗(ωF )
(33)
where
C1(ωF ) = (V (P






P ∗(ωF ) is the solution for Equation 35, which is the same as Equation 16 where we substitute
ωF for F :
(β1 − β2)[B2(ωF )][P ∗(ωF )]β2 + (β1 − 1)
P ∗(ωF )
r − µ
− β1I = 0 (35)











And V (P ∗(ωF ), ωF ) (i.e., the value of the project when the price floor is ωF ) is the same as
Equation 8 where we substitute ωF for F :





It is straightforward to see that P ∗(F ) < P ∗(ωF ) because the values of ω are within the
interval [0, 1] and hence ωF < F 3. In other words, if investors are still waiting to invest when
the price floor is F then they are certainly waiting to invest when the price floor is ωF , because
lower price floor is equal to a higher threshold. Consequently, if an investor is willing to invest in
a project with a price floor of ωF , an investment where the price floor is equal to F is even more
attractive. Hence, the second branch (i.e., P > P ∗(ωF )) never occurs.
Substituting C1(ωF )P




+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2FR(P, F )
∂P 2
− rFR(P, F ) + λ[C1(ωF )P β1 − FR(P, F )] = 0 (38)
3In Figure 1, we can see that the investment threshold curve is a decreasing curve, thus P ∗(F ) < P ∗(ωF ) when
the values of ω are within the interval [0, 1]
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The solution to the ODE (Equation 38) is:
FR(P, F ) = E1P
η1 + C1(ωF )P
β1 (39)
where η1 is the positive root to the following quadratic equation:





















The value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions are:
E1P
∗η1
R + C1(ωF )P
∗β1
R = V (P
∗
R, F )− I (42)
η1E1P
∗η1
R + β1C1(ωF )P
∗β1
R =
∂V (P ∗R, F )
∂P
P ∗R (43)
where the value of the project is:













for P ∗R > F
(44)
From Equation 42, we find that E1 is equal to







E1 in Equation 39 yields:
FR(P, F ) =









β1 for P < P ∗R
V (P, F )− I for P > P ∗R
(45)
In addition, Equations 42 and 43 reduce to the following equation:
η1(V (P
∗
R, F )− I) + (β1 − η1)C1(ωF )P
∗β1
R =
∂V (P ∗R, F )
∂P
P ∗R (46)
For P ∗R < F , the value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions reduce to the following
equation:




















From Equation 48, we show that the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are not
met for P ∗R < F , because (C1(ωF ) − A1) < 0 4. Hence, investment never occurs in this region,




> I, for which investment occurs immediately and generates a risk-free payoff
(i.e., a positive NPV for every P ).
For P ∗R > F , the value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions reduce to the following
equation that must be solved numerically to find the investment threshold P ∗R:
(η1 − β2)B2P ∗
β2
R − (η1 − β1)C1(ωF )P ∗
β1
R + (η1 − 1)
P ∗R
r − µ
− η1I = 0 (49)
In Appendix E, we prove that the value of the option and investment threshold with and
without regulatory uncertainty are the same when λ → 0. This result can be explained through
parameter λ, because the average time difference between two consecutive jump events is equal
to 1/λ. Thus, the jump event never occurs when λ→ 0. The same result holds when ω = 1 (i.e.,
ωF = F ), because the price floor never changes even when jump events occur.
In addition, as the average time difference between two consecutive jump events goes to 0
(i.e., λ → +∞), the value of the option and investment threshold reduce to the results with no
regulatory uncertainty where the price floor is equal to ωF , instead of F .
4.2 Finite Guarantee
In this section, we model a FIT with a finite guarantee that can be affected by a policy change




+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2FFR(P, F )
∂P 2
− rFFR(P, F ) + λ[FF (P, ωF )− FFR(P, F )] = 0 (50)
where FFR(P, F ) is the value of option with regulatory uncertainty and FF (P, ωF ) is the value
of the option when the price floor is ωF . FF (P, ωF ) (i.e., Equation 51) is equal to Equation 25
where we substitute ωF for F .
FF (P, ωF ) =

D1(ωF )P
β1 for P < P ∗F (ωF )
VF (P, ωF )− I for P > P ∗F (ωF )
(51)
where
D1(ωF ) = (VF (P
∗
F (ωF ), ωF )− I)
(
1
P ∗F (ωF )
)β1
(52)
Following the same steps as in the previous section, in order to find the investment threshold
P ∗F (ωF ), we substitute ωF for F in Equation 26.
And, we calculate the value of the project VF (P
∗(ωF ), ωF ), by substituting ωF for F in
Equation 21.
Similar to the perpetual case, we also know that P ∗F (F ) < P
∗
F (ωF ) because the values of ω are
within the interval [0, 1] and ωF < F . Hence, the second branch (i.e P > P ∗F (ωF )) never occurs.
Substituting the value of the option when the price floor is ωF (i.e., FF (P, ωF ) = D1(ωF )P
β1)




+ 0.5σ2 P 2
∂2FFR(P, F )
∂P 2
− rFFR(P, F ) + λ[D1(ωF )P β1 − FFR(P, F )] = 0 (53)
The general solution to this ODE is given by:




Following the same steps as in the previous sections, the value of the option is:












β1 for P < P ∗FR
VF (P, F )− I for P > P ∗FR
(55)
And, the investment threshold is the solution of the followings equations that must be solved
numerically:

(η1 − β1)(A1N(dβ1)−D1(ωF ))P
∗β1














e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) = 0 for P ∗FR < F
−(η1 − β1)(A1(1−N(dβ1)) +D1(ωF ))P
∗β1











e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
= 0 for P ∗FR > F
(56)
Following the same steps in Section 3.2, we can find the value of F that both branches in
Equation 56 yield the same value of P ∗FR. The following nonlinear equation must be solved
numerically in order to find this value of F :
D1(ωF ))F













− (η1 − β1)(A1(1−N(dβ1(P ∗FR=F )))− η1I = 0 (57)
Where dβ(P
∗
FR = F ) is equal to:
dβ(P
∗












In addition, we prove in Appendix F that the value of the option FFR(P, F ) and investment
threshold P ∗FR reduce to the equations without regulatory uncertainty when λ→ 0 (i.e., the event
never occurs) or ω = 1 (i.e., the price floor never changes). In addition, when λ→ +∞ (i.e., the
event certainly occurs), the value of the option FFR(P, F ) and investment threshold P
∗
FR reduce
to equations with no regulatory uncertainty where the price floor is ωF , instead of F .
4.3 Numerical Analysis
This section presents an analysis of the investment thresholds and the influence of a regulatory
uncertainty on a renewable energy project. In particular, we analyze the investment thresholds
by changing: (i) the mean arrival rate of the jump event λ, (ii) the parameter ω that changes the
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price floor to ωF if the jump event occurs, and (iii) the volatility σ. For the analysis, we use the
same base-case parameters in Table 1 together with ω = 0.8 and λ = 0.5.
The jump event can be consider as an unexpected5 reduction due to a regulator’s decision. For
instance, the Switzerland Federal Authorities reduced in 2015 the solar FIT payments (Woods
2014) as following: 12% reduction for installations over 1MW, 18% for installations between 30kW
- 1MW, and a 23% reduction for installations under 30kW.
Perpetual Without Regulatory Uncertainty (P *)
Perpetual With Regulatory Uncertainty (PR
*)
Finite Without Regulatory Uncertainty (PF
*)





















Figure 4: Optimal investment threshold for a perpetual and finite guarantee with and without
regulatory uncertainty as a function of F
Figure 4 presents the value of the investment thresholds for a finite guarantee and for a
perpetual guarantee with and without regulatory uncertainty as a function of the price floor F .
We also include the value of ωF and the value of the price floor F . Recall that the perpetual
guarantee only induces investment for P < F when F > rI and consequently generates a positive
NPV for any P (i.e., a risk-free profit). A finite guarantee is able to induce investment for market
prices below F without producing a risk-free profit. The investment threshold for the finite case
is higher than the perpetual case within a scenario with regulatory uncertainty and also without
regulatory uncertainty. This is an expected result because investors have a guarantee for a shorter
period of time in the finite case.
When comparing the perpetual thresholds with and without regulatory uncertainty, the in-
vestment threshold is lower when a regulatory uncertainty is present. The same results hold for
the finite thresholds with and without regulatory uncertainty. Hence, regulatory uncertainty ac-
celerates investment because investors are willing to invest earlier in order to guarantee a higher
price floor.
In the finite case with regulatory uncertainty, we calculate the price floor where both branches
of Equation 56 yield the same value of P ∗FR. From the base-case parameters, we find that price
floors above e 36.97 / MWh are recommended values for policymakers because they guarantee
that investors start receiving the price floor instead of the market price when the project starts.
Figure 5 presents the investment thresholds as a function of the parameter ω. Recall that the
price floor changes to ωF when a jump event occurs. We observe that the investment thresholds
for the perpetual case P ∗R and the finite case P
∗
FR decrease as we reduce ω. This is due to the
5We are not considering reductions based on a mechanism known as ’degression’, where new registrants know
in advance that tariffs are going to be reduced progressively.
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Figure 5: Optimal investment threshold for a perpetual and finite guarantee with and without
regulatory uncertainty as a function of ω
fact that lower values of ω produce higher reductions in the price floor and consequently a lower
expected profit. These potential losses lead to lower investment thresholds, because investors
decide to accelerate investment in order to guarantee a higher price floor. When ω is equal to
one (i.e., no reduction in the price floor), the thresholds with regulatory uncertainty meet the
thresholds without regulatory uncertainty, within both the perpetual and finite cases6. Table
3 presents investment thresholds for some values of ω. For instance, an ω of 0.85 represents a
reduction of 15% in the price floor, which leads to a reduction of 8.60% in the perpetual guarantee’s
threshold and 1.15% in the finite guarantee’s threshold. We can observe from Table 3 and Figure
5 that the perpetual case leads to a higher reduction than the finite case, because the perpetual
guarantee is more affected by ω due to the longer duration of the guarantee.
Table 3: Examples of reductions of the threshold for different values of ω
ω % Reduction Perpetual Guarantee % Reduction Finite Guarantee % Reduction
Price Floor Threshold Threshold Threshold Threshold
(e / MWh) (Perpetual) (e / MWh) (Finite)
0.95 5.00% 38.35 5.23% 49.74 0.47%
0.90 10.00% 37.77 6.65% 49.55 0.84%
0.85 15.00% 36.99 8.60% 49.40 1.15%
0.80 20.00% 36.38 10.10% 49.28 1.40%
0.75 25.00% 35.90 11.29% 49.18 1.60%
Figure 6 presents the investment thresholds for different values of the parameter λ of the
Poisson process. Recall that the probability of occurring a jump event is λdt. In Figure 6, we
see that the threshold decreases as the lambda increases, for both the perpetual and finite cases.
This is due to the fact that higher values of λ increase the probability of occurring a reduction in
the price floor before the project starts. Consequently, investors accelerate investment in order to
6Appendix E and Appendix F also reach the same conclusion with an analytical approach
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Figure 6: Optimal investment threshold for a perpetual and finite guarantee with and without
regulatory uncertainty as a function of λ
guarantee a higher price floor. Table 4 presents the reduction of the thresholds for the perpetual
and finite cases for different values of λ. We also calculate the expected time to occur a reduction,
which is equal to 1/λ. For instance, a λ equal to 0.5 has an expected time to occur the reduction
of 2 years, which leads to a reduction of 10.10% in the perpetual guarantee’s threshold and a
reduction of 1.40% in the finite guarantee’s threshold. We also observe a higher reduction in the
perpetual case than the finite case, because the perpetual guarantee has a longer duration.
Table 4: Examples of reductions of the threshold for different values of λ
λ Expected Time Perpetual Guarantee % Reduction Finite Guarantee % Reduction
To Occur Threshold Threshold Threshold Threshold
Reduction (years) (e / MWh) (Perpetual) (e / MWh) (Finite)
0.1 10 38.82 4.07% 49.75 0.46%
0.2 5 37.88 6.40% 49.59 0.77%
0.5 2 36.38 10.10% 49.28 1.40%
1.0 1 35.26 12.87% 48.94 2.07%
2.0 0.5 34.29 15.25% 48.53 2.90%
Figure 7 depicts the investment thresholds as a function of the volatility σ. The results of
the thresholds with regulatory uncertainty follow the same pattern as the thresholds without
regulatory uncertainty, for both the perpetual and finite cases. In summary, market uncertainty
defers investment for all cases.
In Figures 4, 5, and 6, note that the gap between the investment thresholds with and without
regulatory uncertainty for the perpetual case is always greater than the gap for the finite case.
This finding in the perpetual guarantee is due to the duration of the guarantee. In other words,
the regulatory uncertainty has a higher impact on a perpetual guarantee because an investor has a
guarantee for a longer period of time. Thus, investors accelerate the investment decision to avoid
the reduction. Also, the investment thresholds of a finite guarantee are always greater than the
investment thresholds of a perpetual guarantee, which is consistent with the findings in Section
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Figure 7: Optimal investment threshold for a perpetual and finite guarantee with and without
regulatory uncertainty as a function of σ
3.3.
5 Concluding Remarks
This work analyzes renewable energy investments with a FIT that includes a minimum price
guarantee in two different scenarios, namely a perpetual guarantee and a finite guarantee. For
each scenario, we derive a real options model in order to calculate the value of the project, the
option value and the optimal investment threshold. In particular, we use an analytical real options
framework with the following embedded options: (i) a waiting option, where the investor may
wait to deploy the project when the market is favorable, and (ii) put options, where the investor
has a set of options to sell the energy for a fixed price (i.e., the price floor) when the market price
is below the price floor.
An interesting finding of our model is that the perpetual guarantee is not economically sound
because it can only induce investment for prices below the price floor when offering a risk-free
investment opportunity. In other words, investment only occurs for market prices below the price
floor when the revenue from the guarantee is higher than the investment cost. This apparent
counter-intuitive result is due to the perpetual guarantee, which is not foregone if investment
does not occur. Within the finite scenario, the support scheme induces an earlier investment
when either the duration of the guarantee or price floor increases.
We then extend the models for the perpetual and finite guarantees in order to include regula-
tory uncertainty. In particular, we model the regulatory uncertainty as an occasional reduction on
the price floor with a Poisson process. With these models, we calculate the value of the project,
the option value and the optimal investment threshold. We find two interesting results. First, the
scenario with a perpetual guarantee continues to induce investment for prices below the price floor
when offering a risk-free investment (i.e., an investment that has a positive NPV). Second, invest-
ment thresholds decrease with either a greater reduction in the price floor or higher probability
of occurring the reduction. These findings are due to the fact that investors prefer to accelerate
investment in order to guarantee a higher investment threshold. In all cases, market uncertainty
defers investment.
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From a policymaking perspective, the model provides interesting insights to FIT design with
a minimum price guarantee. In particular, the definition of the value of the price floor is a key
challenge for policymakers, whereby the scheme should provide a secure investment while creating
an incentive for investors to produce energy when demand is high. In this paper, we shed some
light on how to define the value of the price floor. An interesting interval for the price floor is when
the tariff induces investment for market prices below the price floor, because an investor starts
the project with a revenue from the guarantee and thus provides a secure investment condition.
Should the market price increase above the price floor, an investor will have an incentive to
produce more energy and thus increase its revenue. In Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, our work
shows how to calculate the price floor interval where the investment trigger is below the price
floor for the finite case. Recall that the perpetual case only induces investment with a risk-free
profit when the market price is below the price floor, which is not a desired condition to be offered
from a feed-in tariff.
Regarding the duration of the finite guarantee, our findings show that the size of the interval
for the price floor decreases as the duration increases, when the market price is below the price
floor. Policymakers have a trade-off to consider. Shorter durations of the guarantee have larger
intervals of the price floor but also have higher investment threshold values. In contrast, longer
durations of the guarantee have smaller intervals of the price floor but have lower investment
threshold values.
When regulatory uncertainty is included in the analysis, the findings have three important
implications for policymakers. First, if the expected time to occur a reduction decreases then
the investment threshold also decreases. In other words, policymakers that reduce the price floor
more frequently are creating conditions for investors to accelerate investment in order to guaran-
tee a higher price floor. Second, greater reductions in the price floor also lead to lower investment
thresholds. Hence, policymakers that apply greater reductions in the price floor are also cre-
ating conditions for investors to accelerate investment. Third, as energy markets become more
volatile, the investment trigger increases. Hence, investors are expected to postpone the invest-
ment decision. In fact, the third implication applies to a scenario with and without regulatory
uncertainty.
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Appendix A Value of the Project with a Finite Guarantee
Building on the work from Shackleton & Wojakowski (2007), we derive a model for a renewable
energy project that has a FIT with a finite guarantee. As demonstrated in Equation 87, the value
of the project with a perpetual guarantee is:











for P > F
(A.1)
Now, the value of the project is extended for a finite guarantee. The value of the project
in Equation A.2 is expressed as the difference between the values of a project with a perpetual
guarantee V (P, F,+∞) and with a delayed perpetual guarantee V (PT , F,+∞) that starts at time
T . Hence, the value of the project until time T 8 (i.e., during the validity of the FIT contract) is:
VG(P, T ) = V (P, F,+∞)− V (PT , F,+∞) = V (P, F,+∞)− e−rTEQ0 [V (PT , F,+∞)] (A.2)
We now derive the values of V (P, F,+∞) and V (PT , F,+∞). Rewriting Equation A.1 yields:















where 1 is an indicator function taking values one when the specified event occurs and zero
otherwise. In addition, the value of a project with a perpetual guarantee that starts at time T is:

























, because of Equation A.2. Following Shackleton & Wojakowski (2007), the










= eq(β)TP βN(dβ) (A.6)




σ2β(β − 1) + βµ− r (A.7)
We can interpret β as an elasticity. Recall that β1 and β2 are the solutions of the quadratic
equation above (i.e., q(β) = 0). In addition, β1 > 1 and β2 < 0. There are also two more values
of β associated with the value of the project, namely β = 0 and β = 1.
7Note that we use a different notation in Equation A.1 for the value of the project, but V (P, F ) in Equation 8
is the same as V (P, F,+∞)
8Also note that we use a different notation in Equation A.2 for the value of the project during the validity of
the FIT contract, but VT (P, F ) in Equation 19 is the same as VG(P, T )
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The cumulative probability distribution function for a standardized normal distribution is
defined by the functionN(dβ). In other words, we can interpret the functionN(dβ) as a probability

















where β1, β2, 0 and 1 can substitute β.
The expected value of the components in V (PT , F,+∞) having elasticity β1 with respect to
PT is:








And the expected value of the components in V (PT , F,+∞) having elasticity β = 0 with
respect to PT is:










And the expected value of the components in V (PT , F,+∞) having elasticity β2 with respect
to PT is:








And the expected value of the components in V (PT , F,+∞) having elasticity β = 1 with
respect to PT is:











Recall that VG(P, T ) = V (P, F,+∞) − e−rTEQ0 [V (PT , F,+∞)] (i.e., Equation A.2). Substi-
tuting Equations A.1, A.10, A.12, A.14 and A.16 into Equation A.2 yields the value of the project
for P < F :












e−(r−µ)TN(d1)] for P < F
(A.17)
As N(−dβ) = 1−N(dβ), we rewrite the value of the project VG(P, T ) for P < F as following:
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e−(r−µ)TN(d1) for P < F (A.18)
We now calculate the value of the project VG(P, T ) for P > F . Substituting Equations A.1,
A.10, A.12, A.14 and A.16 into Equation A.2 yields:












e−(r−µ)TN(d1)] for P > F
(A.19)
As N(−dβ) = 1−N(dβ), we rewrite Equation A.19 as:








(1− e−(r−µ)TN(d1)) for P > F
(A.20)
Hence, the value of the project is:




















(1− e−(r−µ)TN(d1)) for P > F
(A.21)
The value of the project VG(P, T ) only considers the cash flow until time T , whereby the finite




e−(r−µ)T , for selling the energy to the market. Hence, the value of the project for
the periods before and after time T is the following:





Appendix B Limits of the Value of a Project with a Finite
Guarantee
This appendix calculates the limits of the value of the project with a finite guarantee (i.e., Equation
A.22). We start with the limit when T → +∞. As Equation A.22 depends on d0, d1, dβ1 and dβ2 ,























































































Recall that β1 and β2 are the solutions of Equation A.7, where β2 < 0 and β1 > 1. Note in
Equation B.3 that µ + σ2(β1 −
1
2
)) is always positive because β1 > 1; thus limT→+∞ dβ1 = +∞.
Similarly, note in Equation B.4 that (µ + σ2(β2 −
1
2
)) is always negative because β2 < 0; hence
limT→+∞ dβ2 is always −∞. As N(+∞) = 1 and N(−∞) = 0, then N(dβ1) = 1 and N(dβ2) = 0.












































for P > F (B.6)
Therefore, we demonstrate that the value of the project with a finite guarantee is the same
value as the perpetual guarantee (i.e., Equation 8) when T → +∞.
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We then calculate the value of the project when T → 0. Equation A.22 depends on d0, d1, dβ1





−∞ for P < F
+∞ for P > F
(B.7)










































for P > F (B.9)
Hence, we demonstrate for both limits above that the value of the project is equal to a cash
flow without a guarantee. In other words, the NPV of a renewable energy project that sells energy
to the market.
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Appendix C Investment Threshold of the Project with a
Finite Guarantee
This appendix presents the derivation of the investment threshold of a renewable energy project
with a finite guarantee. Recall that the investment threshold satisfies the value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions. From the investor’s perspective, the value-matching condition is the
optimal investment point where the decision of holding the option or deploying the project is
indifferent. The smooth-pasting condition is a requirement in which the value of the option needs
to be tangent to the value of the project at the optimal investment point.
Appendix C.1 The Investment Threshold for the First Interval: P <
F
For P < F , we calculate the value-matching condition in Equation C.1. Note that Equation C.1
represents the optimal investment point where the value of the option (i.e., D1P
∗β1
F ) is equal to















e−(r−µ)T − I (C.1)
We also calculate the smooth-pasting condition in Equation C.2, where the slope of the value
of the option is equal to the slope of the value of the project. Hence, we calculate the first

































As in Shackleton & Wojakowski (2007), the partial derivatives of the cumulative distribution
function cancel across the betas, reducing the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to
the following nonlinear equation:










(1− e−rT (1−N(d0)))− I
)
(C.3)
Equation C.3 must be solved numerically to find optimal exercise threshold, P ∗F .
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Appendix C.2 The Investment Threshold for the Second Interval:
P > F
For P > F , we calculate the value-matching condition in Equation C.4. Similar to the previous
section, Equation C.1 represents the optimal investment point where the value of the option (i.e.,
D2P
∗β1


















e−(r−µ)T − I (C.4)
We then calculate the smooth-pasting condition in Equation C.5. Again, we calculate the first



































As mentioned in the previous section, the partial derivatives of the cumulative distribution
function cancel across the betas, reducing the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to
the following nonlinear equation:













e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
(C.6)
Equation C.6 must be solved numerically to find optimal exercise threshold, P ∗F .
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Appendix D Proof that the value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions are not met for P ∗R < F
This appendix proves that (C1(ωF ) − A1) < 0. Hence, the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions are not met for the first branch of the value of the project (i.e.: P ∗R < F ).
Proof. We know that the value of the option with a price floor of F (i.e., F (P, F )) is greater than
the value of the option with a price floor of ωF (i.e., F (P, ωF )), because F > ωF . Hence:
F (P, F ) > F (P, ωF ) (D.1)
Substituting Equation 15 for F (P, F ) and Equation 33 for F (P, ωF ) yields:












































> C1(ωF ) (D.5)
Hence,

















< 0. Otherwise, investment occurs immediately and generate a risk-free payoff.
One of the conditions of real options models is to have a high sunk cost. In other words, to have
the value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions, the value of the project minus investment
(NPV) for P = 0 should be lower than zero. Hence:











C1(ωF )− A1 < 0 (D.8)
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Appendix E Limits of the Value of the Option with a
Perpetual Guarantee and Regulatory Uncer-
tainty
This appendix calculates the limits of the value of the option and the investment threshold with
a perpetual guarantee and regulatory uncertainty.
Appendix E.1 Limits when λ→ 0
We prove that the value of the option with regulatory uncertainty, FR(P, F ) (i.e., Equation 45)
reduces to the value of the option without regulatory uncertainty F (P, F ) (i.e., Equation 15).
The limit of FR(P, F ) when λ goes to 0 is:
lim
λ→0
FR(P, F ) = lim
λ→0
[










for P < F (E.1)
Note that limλ→0 η1 = β1, therefore:
lim
λ→0
FR(P, F ) =
[





























= F (P, F ) (E.2)
Hence, when λ goes to 0, the value of the option with perpetual guarantee and regulatory
uncertainty is equal to Equation 15, i.e the value of the option without a regulatory uncertainty.
Also, when λ goes to 0, it is easy to see that Equation 49 (i.e., the investment threshold
with regulatory uncertainty, P ∗R) reduces to Equation 16 (i.e., the investment threshold without




(η1 − β2)B2P ∗
β2
R − (η1 − β1)C1(ωF )P ∗
β1







(β1 − β2)B2P ∗
β2
R − (β1 − β1)C1(ωF )P ∗
β1







(β1 − β2)B2P ∗
β2






In other words, when the probability of occurring a policy change goes to zero (i.e., the event
will not occur), the value of the option FR(P, F ) is the same as F (P, F ), which is the value of the
option without regulatory uncertainty.
Appendix E.2 Values when ω = 1
Next, we calculate the investment threshold and value of option with regulatory uncertainty
when ω = 1, whereby the price floor never changes when jump events occur (i.e., F = ωF ). It is
straightforward to see that, when ω = 1, the following occurs: (i) B2(ωF ) in Equation 36 is equal
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to B2, (ii) P
∗(ωF ) is equal to P ∗, (iii) V (P ∗(ωF ), ωF ) in Equation 37 is equal to V (P ∗, F ), and











for C1(ωF ) in Equation 49 yields:
(η1 − β2)B2P ∗













+ (η1 − 1)
P ∗
r − µ
− η1I = 0 (E.4)
Expanding Equation E.4 yields:
η1B2P
∗β2 − β2B2P ∗














− η1I = 0 (E.5)










Re-aranging Equation E.6 yields:
(β1 − β2)B2P ∗
β2 + (β1 − 1)
P ∗
r − µ
− β1I = 0 (E.7)
Equation E.7 is equal to Equation 16. Therefore, when ω = 1, the investment threshold of
the project with a perpetual guarantee and regulatory uncertainty is equal to the investment
threshold of the project with a perpetual guarantee, but without regulatory uncertainty.





for C1(ωF ) in Equation 45 yields:
FR(P, F ) =

(












for P < P ∗
V (P, F )− I for P > P ∗
(E.8)
Hence,
FR(P, F ) =






for P < P ∗
V (P, F )− I for P > P ∗
(E.9)
Note that Equation E.9 is equal to Equation 15. Hence, when ω = 1, the value of the option
with a perpetual guarantee and regulatory uncertainty, FR(P, F ) is equal to the value of the
project with a perpetual guarantee and without regulatory uncertainty, F (P, F ).
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Appendix E.3 Limits when λ→ +∞
Finally, we check the investment threshold and value of option with regulatory uncertainty when
λ → +∞. In this condition, the event certainly occurs. Hence, the investment threshold and
the value of the option with regulatory uncertainty reduce to the equations without regulatory
uncertainty where the price floor is ωF instead of F .
The value of the option of a project with regulatory uncertainty is:
FR(P, F ) =









β1 for P < P ∗R
V (P, F )− I for P > P ∗R
(E.10)





goes to 0, when
λ → +∞ because from Equation 40, limλ→+∞ η1 = +∞. Hence, Equation E.10 reduces to the
following:
FR(P, F ) =

C1(ωF )P
β1 for P < P ∗R
V (P, F )− I for P > P ∗R
(E.11)





for C1(ωF ) in Equation E.11 yields:
FR(P, F ) =






for P < P ∗(ωF )
V (P, ωF )− I for P > P ∗(ωF )
(E.12)
Hence, when λ goes to +∞, the value of the option with a perpetual guarantee and regulatory
uncertainty, FR(P, F ) is equal to the value of the project without regulatory uncertainty where
the price floor is equal to ωF instead of F (i.e., F (P, ωF )).
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Appendix F Limits of the Finite Guarantee with Regula-
tory Uncertainty
This appendix calculates the limits of the value of the option and the investment threshold with
a finite guarantee and regulatory uncertainty.
Appendix F.1 Limits when λ→ 0
We prove that the value of the option with regulatory uncertainty FFR(P, F ) (i.e., Equation 55)
reduces to the value of the option without regulatory uncertainty FF (P, F ) (i.e., Equation 25).
The limit of FR(P, F ) when λ→ 0 is:
lim
λ→0
















for P < P ∗FR (F.1)
Recall that limλ→0 η1 = β1, therefore:
lim
λ→0
FFR(P, F ) = (VF (P
∗
















−D1(ωF )P β1 +D1(ωF )P β1
= (VF (P
∗





for P < P ∗FR (F.2)
Hence, when λ goes to 0, the value of the option with finite guarantee and regulatory uncer-
tainty is equal to Equation 25, i.e the value of the option without regulatory uncertainty.
Also, when λ goes to 0, it is straightforward to see that Equation 56 (i.e., the investment
threshold with regulatory uncertainty, P ∗FR) reduces to Equation 26 (i.e., the investment threshold
without regulatory uncertainty, P ∗F ), as shown below.
The equations to calculate the investment threshold with regulatory uncertainty are:

(η1 − β1)(A1N(dβ1)−D1(ωF ))P
∗β1














e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) = 0 for P ∗FR < F
−(η1 − β1)(A1(1−N(dβ1)) +D1(ωF ))P
∗β1
FR









e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
= 0 for P ∗FR > F
(F.3)
We know that limλ→0 η1 = β1. Thus, the first branch of Equation F.3 yields the following
equation when λ→ 0:
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+ (β1 − 1)
P ∗FR
r − µ
e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) = 0 (F.4)
In addition, for P ∗FR > F , the second branch of Equation F.3 yields the following equation
when λ→ 0:








e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
= 0 for P > P ∗FR (F.5)
Hence, the two equations above reduce to the equations of the investment threshold without
regulatory uncertainty.
Appendix F.2 Values when ω = 1
Next, we calculate the investment threshold and value of option with regulatory uncertainty
when ω = 1, whereby the price floor never changes when jump events occur (i.e., F = ωF ). It
is straightforward to see that when ω = 1, the following occurs: (i) B2(ωF ) in Equation 36 is
equal to B2, (ii) A1(ωF ), which is equal to Equation 9 where we substitute ωF for F is equal to
A1,(ii) P
∗
F (ωF ) is equal to P
∗
F , (iii) VF (P
∗(ωF ), ωF ), which we find by substituting ωF for F in
Equation 21 is equal to VF (P
∗, F ), and (iv) D1(ωF ) in Equation 52 is equal to D1(F ). Hence,
substituting (VF (P



























e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) = 0 for P ∗FR < F
−(η1 − β1)
(















e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
= 0 for P ∗FR > F
(F.6)
When P ∗FR < F , we substitute Equation 21 for (VF (P
∗(F ), F ) in Equation F.6, which yields:
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(η1 − β1) (A1N(dβ1))P
∗β1
F − (η1 − β1)A1P
∗β1
F N(dβ1)


















+ (η1 − 1)
P ∗F
r − µ
e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) = 0 (F.7)
Simplifying Equation F.7 yields:








(1− e−rT (1−N(d0)))− I
)
= 0 (F.8)
And for P ∗FR > F , substituting Equation 21 to (VF (P
∗(F ), F ) yields:
− (η1 − β1)A1(1−N(dβ1))P
∗β1






e−rT (1−N(d0)) +B2P ∗β2F (1−N(dβ2)) +
P ∗F
r − µ
(1− e−(r−µ)TN(d1) + e−(r−µ)T )− I)
+ (η1 − β2)B2P ∗β2F (1−N(dβ2))








e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
= 0 (F.9)
Simplifying Equation F.9, yields:










e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
= 0 (F.10)
Hence, when ω = 1, the investment threshold of the project with regulatory uncertainty is
equal to the investment threshold of the project without regulatory uncertainty (i.e., Equation
26).





for D1(ωF ) in Equation 55
and P ∗F for P
∗
FR. Thus, yielding:





















P β1 for P < P ∗F
VF (P, F )− I for P > P ∗F
(F.11)
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Simplifying Equation F.11 yields:
FFR(P, F ) =






for P < P ∗F
V (P, F )− I for P > P ∗F
(F.12)
Note that Equation F.12 is equal to Equation 25. Therefore, when ω = 1, the value of
the option with regulatory uncertainty, FFR(P, F ) is equal to the value of the option without
regulatory uncertainty, FF (P, F ).
Appendix F.3 Limits when λ→ +∞
Next, we check the investment threshold and value of option of the project with regulatory
uncertainty when λ→ +∞. The limit when λ→ +∞ means that the event occurs immediately.
Hence, the investment threshold and the value of the option with regulatory uncertainty reduce
to the values without regulatory uncertainty, where the price floor is ωF instead of F .
The value of the option of the project with regulatory uncertainty is:












β1 for P < P ∗FR
VF (P, F )− I for P > P ∗FR
(F.13)





goes to 0, when
λ → +∞ because from Equation 40, limλ→+∞ η1 = +∞. Hence, Equation F.13 reduces to the
following:
FFR(P, F ) =

D1(ωF )P
β1 for P < P ∗FR
V (P, F )− I for P > P ∗FR
(F.14)
Substituting D1(ωF ) by (VF (P
∗
F (ωF ), ωF )− I)
(
1
P ∗F (ωF )
)β1
(Equation 52) yields:




F (ωF ), ωF )− I)
(
P
P ∗F (ωF )
)β1
for P < P ∗F (ωF )
V (P, ωF )− I for P > P ∗F (ωF )
(F.15)
Hence, when λ goes to +∞, the value of the option of a project with regulatory uncertainty,
FFR(P, F ) is equal to the value of the option of a project without regulatory and with a price
floor of ωF instead of F , FF (P, ωF ).
Appendix F.4 Limits when T → +∞
Finally, we prove that the value of the option of a project with a finite guarantee and regulatory
uncertainty when T → +∞ is equal to the value of the option of a project with a perpetual
guarantee and regulatory uncertainty. We first demonstrate that the investment threshold of
both are the same. For P > P ∗FR, the investment threshold of a project with finite guarantee and
regulatory uncertainty (i.e., Equation 56) is:
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− (η1 − β1)(A1(1−N(dβ1)) +D1(ωF ))P
∗β1
FR + (η1 − β2)B2P
∗β2
FR (1−N(dβ2))
+ (η1 − 1)
P ∗FR
r − µ




e−rT (1−N(d0)) + I
)
= 0 (F.16)
When T → +∞, we have:
− (η1 − β1)(A1(1−N(dβ1)) +D1(ωF ))P
∗β1
FR + (η1 − β2)B2P
∗β2
FR (1−N(dβ2))
+ (η1 − 1)
P ∗FR
r − µ
− η1I = 0 (F.17)
In addition, as we demonstrated in Appendix B: (i) limT→∞N(dβ2) = 0 and, (ii) limT→∞N(dβ1) =
1. Hence, Equation F.17 yields:
− (η1 − β1)(D1(ωF ))P ∗β1FR + (η1 − β2)B2P
∗β2
FR + (η1 − 1)
P ∗FR
r − µ
− η1I = 0 (F.18)
Also, it is easy to see that limT→+∞D1(ωF ) = C1(ωF ), since we demonstrated in Appendix
B that the value of the project with a finite guarantee is the same as the value of the project of
a perpetual guarantee when T → +∞. Therefore, when T → +∞, the investment threshold of a
project with a finite guarantee and regulatory uncertainty is the same as the investment threshold
of a project with a perpetual guarantee and regulatory uncertainty.
The value of the option of a project with finite guarantee and regulatory uncertainty (i.e.,
Equation 55) is:












β1 for P < P ∗FR
VF (P, F )− I for P > P ∗FR
(F.19)




R, Equation F.19 yields:
FFR(P, F ) =









β1 for P < P ∗R
VF (P, F )− I for P > P ∗R
(F.20)
which is the same as Equation 45 (i.e., the value of the option with perpetual guarantee and
regulatory uncertainty).
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Appendix G Derivative of the Optimal Threshold with
Respect to T
This appendix calculates the derivative of the optimal threshold with respect to T and evaluates
the sign. Therefore, we derive Equation 26 with respect to T . Note that the partial derivative of
β1, β2, and B2 with respect to T is zero because these terms do not depend on T . In addition,
recall that the partial derivatives of the cumulative distribution function cancel across the betas
(Shackleton & Wojakowski 2007).
We first calculate the derivative of P ∗F with respect to T for the first branch (i.e.: P
∗
F < F )











− (β1 − 1)P ∗F e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) + β1Fe−rT (1−N(d0)) = 0 (G.1)
Re-aranging Equation G.1 yields:
(
−(β1 − β2)B2β2P ∗
β2−1







= (β1 − 1)P ∗F e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1))− β1Fe−rT (1−N(d0)) (G.2)




in Equation G.2 is always positive. In addition, we know that P ∗F < F because we
calculated the derivative for the first branch, thus β1Fe





For the second branch (i.e.: P ∗F > F ), the derivative of the trigger with respect to T is:











1− e−(r−µ)TN(d1) + e−(r−µ)T
)
− (β1 − 1)P ∗F e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) + β1Fe−rT (1−N(d0)) = 0 (G.3)
Re-aranging Equation G.4 yields:
(






1− e−(r−µ)TN(d1) + e−(r−µ)T
)) ∂P ∗F
∂T
= (β1 − 1)P ∗F e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1))− β1Fe−rT (1−N(d0)) (G.4)
As this is the trigger of the second branch and P ∗F > F then (β1− 1)P ∗F e−(r−µ)T (1−N(d1)) >
β1Fe
−rT (1−N(d0)); consequently, the right hand side of the Equation G.4 is positive. In addition,
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flows from investments that enhance energy efficiency’, Journal of Environmental Manage-
ment 116, 113 – 124.
Abolhosseini, Shahrouz & Almas Heshmati (2014), ‘The main support mechanisms to finance
renewable energy development’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 40, 876 – 885.
Adkins, Roger & Dean Paxson (2016), ‘Subsidies for renewable energy facilities under uncertainty’,
The Manchester School 84(2), 222 – 250.
Adkins, Roger & Dean Paxson (2017), Risk sharing with collar options in infrastructure invest-
ments, in ‘Real Options Conference’.
Boomsma, Trine Krogh & Kristin Linnerud (2015), ‘Market and policy risk under different re-
newable electricity support schemes’, Energy 89, 435 – 448.
Boomsma, Trine Krogh, Nigel Meade & Stein-Erik Fleten (2012), ‘Renewable energy investments
under different support schemes: A real options approach’, European Journal of Operational
Research 220(1), 225 – 237.
Brennan, Michael J & Eduardo S Schwartz (1985), ‘Evaluating natural resources investments’,
The Journal of Business 58, 135–57.
Butler, Lucy & Karsten Neuhoff (2008), ‘Comparison of feed-in tariff, quota and auction mecha-
nisms to support wind power development’, Renewable Energy 33(8), 1854 – 1867.
Ceseña, E.A. Mart́ınez, J. Mutale & F. Rivas-Dávalos (2013), ‘Real options theory applied to
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